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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF THE 
LPTR SCRAM SYSTEM 
Abstract 
The protective control or scram sys­
tem of tlic Livermore Pool Type Reactor 
{LPTR) has been .subjected to fault tree 
analysis to determine its vulnerability to 
various component failures or other un­
toward events both credible and incredible. 
This report describes the analysis and 
discusses the results. The principal r e ­
sult is that no single component failure 
nor any single credible event can result in 
a failure of the reactor to scram when a 
scram is required. 
Introduction 
The Livermore Pool Type Reactor 
(LPTR) is a scientific research reactor 
used primarily as a source of neutrons 
for irradiation experiments. It is designed 
to operate* at a maximum power level of 
S M\\ thermal, A detailed description of 
the reactor and its protection system is 
given in the LPTR Safety Analysis Report. 
The staff at LPTR performed the fault 
t ree analysis described here to determine 
whether the scram system could with-
1 
stand a single failure and still shut down 
the reactor. As a result of our analysis 
we conclude that no single component 
failure nor any single credible event can 
result in a failure of the reactor to scram 
when a scram is required. 
The appendices to the report include 
control system diagrams for the LPTR, 
diagrams of the fault tree analyzed in 
this study, and results of the computer 
analysis of the fault t ree . 
The LPTR Control System 
The reactor is brought to its operating 
power of 3 MW thermal by manually po­
sitioning four shim rods to achieve the 
desired criticality and balance in the r e ­
actor core. The power is then automat-
1, Safety Analysis Report for the Liver­
more Pool Type Reactor. Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory, Rept. UCRL-
5142J (Sept. 19, 1974). 
ically regulated by a fifth regulating 
rod. 
Reactor shutdown is accomplished by 
inserting the four shim rods into the core. 
Any two shim rods fully entering the coie 
insert sufficient negative reactivity to 
shut the reactor down. 
The shim rods are coupled to the 
rod drive assemblies by sensitive 
electromagnets. When a magnet i.s de-
energized the associated shim rod falls by 
force of gravity back into the core. Each 
magnet is powered by a separate dc power 
supply and driven by a separate vacuum-tube 
amplifier. The safety interlock chain 
(shown on page '34 of the control system 
drawings. Appendix A) removes the ac 
power from all four magnet power supplies 
through the contacts of relay 62. 
The magnet amplifiers control the 
current at the negative terminals of the 
magnets. The inputs to the four magnet 
amplifiers are tied to a common bus 
called the sigma bus. The sigma bus is 
driven by four independent sigma ampli­
fiers, any one of which will drive the 
Fault tree analysis is a technique by 
which computers can be used to determine 
which faults and which combinations of 
faults can result in a particular system 
failure. References 2 and 3 discuss 
the fault t ree analysis method in more 
detail. 
In this report the system failure event 
of interest is: three or more shim rods 
fail to fully enter the core when a scram 
condition exists. This is called the "top 
event," 
The analysis is accomplished by draw­
ing a fault tree model which uses a logic 
symbol format to represent the sensing 
and control functions of the reactivity 
control system of the reactor as they 
relate to the top event. Five symbols 
make up the fault t ree ; "and" gates, "or" 
gates, circles, diamonds, and houses 
{see Fig, 3), 
four magnet amplifiers to cutoff. Three 
Y of thes? sigma amplifiers sense powt-r 
level, resulting in a scram at a power 
level of 4,5 MW. The fourth sigma 
amplifier initiates a scram when the 
period is less than 1 sec. 
The block diagram of reactor nuclear 
instrumentation is shown in Fig. 1. 
• Figure 2 shows how the sigma bus 
and associated amplifiers are inter­
connected. 
Included for reference in Appendix A 
are pages 8, 13, 14, and 24 of Dwg. No. 
LEA-01-3154-01, the drawings of the 
control system for the LFTR, which con­
tain the circuits for the safety interlock 
chain and the associated relay coils. 
An "and" gate requires that all Inputs 
to it be satisfied before an output from it 
will occur. 
An "or" gate requires only that one or 
more of the inputs to it be satisfied before 
an output from it will occur. 
A circle represents a component pri­
mary failure, which is sufficient to 
actuate an input to a gate. The meaning 
of "component" is subject to definition to 
suit the case being analyzed, but in all 
cases it is the final termination of a par­
ticular branch of the fault t ree, as 
2, D. F. Haasl, "Advanced Concepts in 
Fault Tree Analysis," in System 
Safety Symposium. June 8-9. 1965 
(The Boeing Company, Seattle, Wash­
ington, 1965). 
3, M, E. Stewart et al^ Reliability 
Analysis of the Power feurst Facility 
Reactor Protection System, Idaho 
Nuclear Corporation, Idaho Falls, 
Idaho (Dec. 1969). 
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of LPTR nuclear instrumentation. 
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'•'£• '•"• -Symbols used in fault t ree analysis. 
determiner] by the desired degree of reso­
lution nf the analysis. Kor example, a 
i:ii-elf may represent a single component 
-»r even a subcomponent, such as the coil 
of a relay, while a second circle may 
represent the contacts. Or one circle 
may represent the normally open contacts, 
while another may represent the normally 
closed contacts. In another case a circle 
may represent an entire amplifier or 
even a system consisting of amplifier, 
detector, and power supply. In general, 
circles represent components or systems 
which may fail to perform their intended 
functions when needed. 
A diamond is similar to a circle in 
that it represents an event which is suf­
ficient to actuate an input to a gate, and 
is also the termination of a particular 
branch of the tree. It differs, however, 
in that : t represents a chassis, a sub­
system, an open- or short-circuit wiring 
fault, a circuit discontinuity, a human 
action, or other event for which the 
analysis is truncated before there is 
sufficient detail developed for it to be 
represented by the additional tree branches 
which would ultimately end in primary 
fault circles. The desired degree of 
resolution dictates when a particular 
branch can be terminated in a diamond. 
Diamonds on the fault tree represent 
unusual failures or abnormal occurrences. 
Examples are a short circuit to a voltage 
source, operator r.rror, and failures r e ­
quiring limiting conditions in order to 
result in a fault. Some diamonds repre­
sent events which are considered to be 
incredible. Each diamond is explained 
by a numbered diamond note. 
Houses in the tree are used as switches 
to enable or disable portions of the tree, 
depending upon which scram conditions 
exist in the analysis being conducted. 
Kach scram condition can be enabled 
individually, or several may be enabled 
simultaneously. For example, one may 
expect that both fast period and high 
power may exist simultaneously. Then* 
are 49 house inputs which serve as 
switches to enable the various scram 
conditions. 
The fault tree is so constructed that it 
can represent the scram system for any 
combination of scram conditions. Table 1 
l is ts each of the possible scram conditions. 
These may occur singly or in combinations 
of two or more occurring simultaneously. 
(Some are mutually exclusive, and some 
are included automatically aj part of 
another scram cordition.) Table 2 lists 
the house conditions which were included 
in the rates input portion ol the data 
cards for this study to simulate 17 scram 
conditions for which computer runs were 
made. 
1 able 1. Scram conditions ant. mechanising of tht- LPTii. 
Condition causing scram Mechanism producing scram 
Fast scrams 
Power >4.5 MW 
Period <1 sec 
Slow scrams 
Pow^r >6 MW (log N) 
Power >4,2 MW: 
Safety amp A 
Safety amp B 
Safety amp C 
Period <1,2 sec (safety amp D) 
Period <5 sec (period recorder) 
Power >7 5'Vo of linear recorder scale 
Primary coolant flow low 
Experiment scram 
Amplifier or power supply troubles 
Rod drop test 
Pool level low 
Primary coolant temperature high 












RE-16, -27, -ifl, -19 in trouble monitor 
RE-2 in rod drop testpr 
RE-60 
RE-2 in primary coolant temperature monitor 
P B - l b 
RE denotes relay. 
PB denotes push button. 
Detailed diagrams of the fault tree 
analyzed in this study are given in Ap­
pendix B, 
The primary objei tive of this analysis 
is to show that the reactor can experience 
the prescribed startup accident and still 
withstand one additional failure. The 
conditions for the prescribed startup 
accident are set forth in Sec, "L5,2.2 of 
the LPTR Safety Analysis Report 1 as 
follow si 
1. The reactor is initially shut down. 
2. The shim rods are withdrawn 
simultaneously at their maximum rate. 
3. All period and high level scrams 
and rundowns fail except the level-safety 
fast scram at 150% of full power. 
4. The shim rods continue out for 
20 msec (the measured delay time) after 
the 150% power level has been reached 
and then fall into the core with an accel­
eration of 5.2 m/s , 
Simulation of the startup accident as 
defined above is readily accomplished in 
either of two ways: 
1, All houses representing power 
£4,5 MW are turned on (tau set equal to 
1), and all houses representing period 
Table 2. Rates input conditions for computer runs. 
...,„......-, 
H.t.J l I I O H * . tiS - 1 
H- 70S <o . : J - • ; • i . > • : • 
1 ; • - * : : • • • ; • 
ti I 9u« • i . . . . . ,p 
•f]^:>l ' , < M i 
'11 1: 
^5 sec are also turned on. Diamond 
D-200 and component C9LNIONC, which 
represents the log N compensated ion 
chamber, are turned on. This effectively 
fails all period and slow scrams (run­
downs are not included in the fault t ree 
analysis of the scram system), leaving 
only the 4.5-MW fast scram (150% of 
full power) to scram the reactor (see 
computer run 16, Appendix C). 
2. A second method is to enable only 
one scram condition, i, e„ house 702 
representing power ^4,5 MW, (House 
704, the complement of house 702, is 
also turned off,) This effectively by­
passes all scrams except the level-
There are no single component failures 
which can result in failure of the reactor 
to scram for the prescribed startup ac­
cident. There are also no pairs of com­
ponents which can result in failure to 
scram. 
safety fast scram at 150% of full power 
(computer run 15, Appendix C), 
Both computer runs were made and 
the results for both were identical, as 
predicted. 
For the startup accident prescribed 
in Sec. 15,2.2 of the LPTR Safety Anal­
ysis Report, there are two single 
events, either of which will result in 
the top event, i . e . , cause two or more 
shim rods to fail to fully enter the 
core; these are diamonds D-100 and 
D-702. Each of these events is 
considered to be outside the limits of 
credible events. (See diamond notes 
2 anu 8, in Appendix B. ) 
As a minimum, failure of three independent 
components — one in each of the three level-
safety fast scram channels — would be r e ­
quired to produce a scram failure that could 
result in release of fission products within 
the reactor containment dome. 
Conclusion 
Appendix A. Control System Diagramsfor the LPTR 
Reproduced here are pages 8, 13, 14, and 24 of the LEA-01-3 154-01 series of 
drawings of the LPTR control system: 
Automatic Rundown and Scram Circuits (p. 8) 10 
Ampli?.. : Trouble iMonitor and Experiment Scram Alarm 
Circuits <p« 13) 11 
Monitor Alarm uiid bcram Circuits (p, 14) » , 12 
Safety Amplifiers and Safety Interlock Chain {p. 24) , . . . . , 13 
Fig. A-1. Automatic rundown and scram 
circuits {p. 8). 
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Appendix B. Fault Tree Analyzed in This Study 
The fault tree analyzed in this study is diagrammed on the following 11 pages, 
labeled sheets 1 through 11. Numbers in parenthesis by the diamonds refer to "diamond 
notes" which are listed beginning on p. 26. 
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DIAMOND NOTES 
1. a. A wiring or connection fault is assumed which places an mm anU-d emf at 
a particular point in the circuit as described in the diamond. The undesired emf causes 
a circuit response which prevents a scram operation from occurring. The emf can be 
ac or dc at any level sufficient to produce the undesired result. 
b. In this case, the undesired emf must be ac applied at any point to the 
node common to terminal 1 of transformer T-2 in any one of the four safety amplifiers, 
all the way to pins 03 and 05 of relay 62. Such a fault energizes all four magnet power 
supplies and prevents the shim rods from dropping via the slow scram system. 
2. This diamond (D-100) was included for two reasons. The first reason is to 
provide a test for those computer runs in which without D-100 there would have been 
no minimal cut sets, (A cut set is a collection of one or more events which will cause 
the top event to occur.) Every computer run will have at least one cut set involving a 
single failure (D-100), thus providing a degree of assurance that the computer run was 
properly executed. The second reason for including D-100 is to give consideration to 
any common mode failure which might result in three or more shim rods failing to 
enter the core after all four had been released from the supporting magnets. The 
event represented by D-100 is considered to be an incredible event. It seems unlikely 
that even an earthquake could deform or tilt the core sufficiently to cause the rods to 
bind and fail to insert fully. Core melt is not a credible mechanism, as is shown by 
the analyses in chapter 15.2.1 in Ref. 1. 
3. This fault can be caused by any mechanical failure or obstruction which 
would prevent an individual shim rod from dropping into the core. 
4. This fault requires that an extremely unlikely combination of wire connection 
faults occur simultaneously so as to place an emf at the V7 and V8 terminals of the 
magnets and a current sink at the B terminals, which is the opposite of the normal 
connections. It is included for completeness, but is considered to be incredible, 
5. The magnets will hold the shim rods in place with either ac or dc current 
flowing (dc is normal). This fault requires a wire connection fault that places at the 
magnet B terminals an ac or dc emf that provides sufficient current to energize the 
magnet and not burn It open. 
6. This fault Is caused by an operator deliberately but erroneously actuating the 
device described in the diamond. This either places the circuits in a state which pre­
vents them from responding as they should to cause a scram, ot else alters or bypasses 
the equipment or circuitry in a manner which prevents a scram. 
7. Shim rod drop is normally caused by cutting off the magnet current at a point 
downstream from the negative terminal. The fault described in this diamond provides 
an unwanted alternate return path which bypasses the normal switching circuit and 
therefore allows magnet current to flow during a scram condition when it is not sup­
posed to flow. 
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B. This fault represents a wiring connection fault that results in the shorting of 
the -sigma bus to a low impedance source of emf in the range between +22 and +45 V dc. 
No such low-impedance source of emf within this range exists in the vicinity of the 
sigma bus or the sigma amplifiers. (A short to ground or dc voltage greater than 
+45 V results in a scrum,) An open circuit between the sigma bus and magnet amplifier 
results in the cutoff of that magnet amplifier, A short to a voltage divider resulting in 
ihe required i22 to +45 V would be driven out of range by the cathode-follower output of 
the sigma amplifiers. The event represented by diamond 702 is considered to be in­
credible, bu1 is included for completeness. 
9. This failure would require coincident events to occur along with the power 
supply failure since the proper power-supply voltage level is monitored by a trouble 
monitor relay. This event might be a wiring connection fault or a relay fault. It is 
credible but unlikely, 
JO. a. Loss of signal or voltage can be caused by open- or short-circuit wir.ng 
connection faults which prevent the equipment being fed from detecting that a scram 
condition exists. 
b. If such a loss of scram signal would normally initiate a trouble-monitor 
slow scram, the coincident wiring connection or relay faults must also exist which 
would pruvent the trouble monitor scram from occurring. This is credible but unlikely. 
11. A failure of the HV supply to the ion chambers prevents them from detecting 
a scram condition, and the power supply low-voltage monitor normally initiates a slow 
scram. This fault, therefore, requires a coincident wire connection or relay failure 
in the monitoring circuit, such that the expected trouble-monitor scram does not occur. 
This is considered credible but unlikely. 
12. This fault is a wire connection open- or short-cirouit fault which prevents the 
normal emf required for circuit operation from reaching the relay coil. 
13. The composite safety amplifiers are normally monitored for proper operation 
by relays in the composite amplifier or by the input signal getting out of normal operating 
range, either of which would trip the slow scram or trouble-monitor scram circuits. 
This failure, therefore, requires the coincident failure of the trouble-monitor circuits 
by wiring-connection or relay faults which prevent trouble-monitor scram from 
occurring. This is credible but unlikely. 
14. Any wire connection short or open circuit in the ion chamber's HV power 
supply leads will inhibit ion chamber operation, and so prevent it from transmitting a 
scram level signal. 
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Appendix C. Results of Computer Analysis of Fault Tree 
Table C-l lists the 17 computer runs made on the fault tree considered Ln this 
study and summarizes the results of each run. Computer printouts of the cut sets for 
the 17 runs are reproduced at the end of this appendix. 
Table C-1. Summary of the computer runs made Ln the fault tree analysis of the LPTR 
scram system. The top event is defined as three or more shim rods fail­
ing to fully entei the core when a scram condition exists. 
Assumption 
Number of single faults 
producing top event 
Number of double faults 
producing top event 
H o u r -4,5 Mtt, period 1 etc (lusts i-igma uua tic ram 
tunctions uad power untl slow .scrums) 
Sjnif us run 1, i-Nicpt thut log N channel Is assumed 
fulled or lrypansc-d initially 
1'ower >ti Mtt 
Power M.5MW, reaihvd gradually 
I'UHI period (• 1 ate) during startup, while in low power 
runjjp (< 10 ktt) 
Same tih run 5 except for higher power range 
f'lQOkVW 
Low -primary -coolant- now acrum condition 
Experiment scrum condition 
Low-primary coolant-level scram condition 
High-primary-coolant-temperature scram condition 
Actuation of manual scram push button 
Power exceeds three-fourths of full scale I linear) 
Same us run 12, plus faat period ("" I sec) 
Same at> run 13 except reactor in high power range 
Failure or slow scram and faM period scram, resulting 
from failure to turn on these scram gates 
Same as run 13, but resulting from failed components 
Same as run 15, but testing for triple failures 
1 (U-I00) 5 
1 (U-loO) 5 
1 ID-10D) 5 
J (D-100) B 
1 UJ-lGu) 164 









1 (D-100) None 
1 (D-100) None 
Z (D-100, -702> None 
2 (D-100, -702) None 
2 (D-100, -702) None (716 triples) 
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The computer runs of greatest significance to this study are runs 15. 16, and 
17. Run 16 represents the specified startup accident. Initial conditions for the 
computer data deck (see Table 2) represent the failure of the slow scram chain (D-200) 
and the fast period channel (log N ion chamber failed). Under these conditions, the 
reactor is scrammed by any one of the three power-level channels through the sigma 
bus and magnet amplifiers. The computer run results in two single failures which can 
cause a failure to scram. These are represented by diamonds D-100 and D-702, The 
diamond notes 2 and 8 (Appendix B) explain why these events are unlikely. 
Computer run 15 also simulates the specified startup accident by a different 
method, but with results identical to run 16, Instead of failing components in the fault 
tree as was done in run 16, In run 15 the gates which enable the slow scram chain and 
the fast period scram are not turned on. This simulates failure of the slow scram mechanism 
(in which B voltage is removed from the magnet coils} and the fast-period scram channel. 
Computer run 17 uses the same rates (failure data) Input as used in run 15, but 
tests for combinations of triple failures. The run reveals a total of 716 combinations 
of triple failures which will result in failure to scram for the specified startup acci­
dent. (The specified startup accident postulates failure of the slow scram chain and 
fast period channel as initial conditions. These are in addition to the triple component 
failures.) The 716 combinations of triple failures consist of combinations, taken three 
at a time, of elements represented by circles and diamonds in the three redundant 
power-level scram channels A, B, and C. The bulky tabulation of these cut sets is 
not Included in the report. 
Computer run 1 and runs 3 through 14 represent normal scram conditions with 
no assumed initial failure. 
Computer run 1 represents both high power (>4.5 MW) and fast period (<,1 sec). 
This Is a test of the sigma bus scram functions. In addition, the period and power 
slow scrams also are tested (power >4,2 MW and period <1,2 sec), since these con­
ditions are included in the assumed initial conditions. For this scram condition, 
there are no credible single or double failures. The incredible failures which result 
from this run include D-100 as the only single, and D-702 In conjunction with a failure 
of the slow scram chain. 
Computer run 2 is the same as run 1 except that the log N channel is assumed 
failed or bypassed Initially, The results for run 2 are identical with the results for 
run 1, This shows that the reactor can operate safely and withstand a single failure 
even with the period scram channel bypassed or failed. 
Computer run 3 assumes the power has exceeded the 200% (6-MW) level. This 
introduces one additional slow scram. This scram mechanism does not affect the 
failure analysis as far as single and double failures are concerned. The results are 
identical with those of computer runs 1 and 2, 
Computer run 4 assumes the power has exceeded the 150% (4.5-MW) level 
gradually without generating a 20-sec-period rundown or a 1-sec-period scram. The 
cut sets for this run include ail those for run 1, plus three additional double failures 
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involving diamond 702 in conjunction with components in the slow scram chain. The 
interpretation of this result Is essentially the same as that for computer run 1, i. e # ) 
there are no credible single or double failures which will result in a failure to scram. 
Computer run 5 assumes a fast period (<1 sec) during startup, while in the low 
power range (<10 kW)( i, e. f before switching from the log-count-rate period amplifier 
to the log-N period amplifier. The run tests the ability of the system to withstand 
single am! double failures and scram the reactor before power reaches the 150% level. 
(Run 1 covers the case of fast period on startup where power exceeds 150%.) There 
are no credible single failures which can result in failure to scram. There are 184 
combinations of double failures (Including six involving the incredible event represented 
by D-702) which could result in failure to scram before reactor power reaches the 150% 
level. 
Computer run 6 assumes the same condition as run 5 except that the analysis is 
for the power range after the operator has switched from the log-count-rate period 
amplifier to the log-N period amplifier (power >100 kW). This run results in single 
failures in the log-N period/power amplifier channel which could result in failure to 
scram before power reaches the 150% level. Any single component in this channel 
which results in failure of the channel to function results in a failure to scram under 
these conditions. In run 15 this channel is assumed failed for the specified startup 
accident. 
Computer runs 7 through 12 each test a scram function on the slow scram chain. 
These conditions are not sensed on the fast scram (sigma bus) circuitry. Therefore, 
in each case there are several single failures that result in failure of a particular 
scram condition to bring about a scram. These include failure of the contacts of 
relay 62 (RE-62) to open, shorts to ac voltage in the magnet power supply circuitry, 
shorts to ac power on the relay scram chain, and failure of the contacts of the relay 
for that particular scram function to open. In each case only a single failure is r e ­
quired as this is a single, series relay chain. 
Computer run 7 assumes the low-primary-coolant-flow scram, condition. This 
run results in nine cut sets representing single failures. 
Computer run 8 assumes the experiment scram condition. This run results in 
i5 cut sets representing single failures. 
Computer run 9 assumes the low-primary-coolant-level scram condition and 
results in 24 cut sets representing single failures. 
Computer run 10 assumes the high-prlmary-coolant-lemperature scram con­
dition. This run results in 25 cut sets representing single failures. 
Computer run 11 assumes the actuation of the manual scram push button. This 
run results in 24 cut sets representing single failures. There are several ways the 
operator can scram the reactor if the scram system should fail to respond to the manual 
scram push button. These are discussed in the operator's procedures for the LPTft. 
Computer run 12 assumes that the power level exceeds the level represented by 
three-fourths of full scale on the linear level recorder. This function is sensed on the 
slow scram chain only. This run results in 27 cut sets representing single failures. 
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Computer run 13 assumes the same condition as in run 12, plus the assumption 
of a fast period (s.1 sec). The reactor power is in the low power range, i. e # 1 the 
period recorder is still connected to the log-count-rate meter. This run results in no 
credible single or double failures which can prevent reactor scram. The diamond 
D-100 is in the only cut set found. 
Computer run 14 is the same as run 13 except that the reactor is in the high 
power range, i, e„ the period recorder has been switched to the log N channel. The 
results of this run are identical with those of run 13, 
The cut seta for the 17 computer runs are reproduced on the following pages. 
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C O M P U T E R PRINTOUTS LISTING CUT SETS AND COMPONENTS 
FOUND IN CRITICAL PATHS 
Runs 1. 2, 3 
-.'.•:• inlet *: t - * . K : VihNi'1:* <c*.K:r*:f. r-~*? 
niHI's'^U CUT SETS FOUND GY COMBO FOR LPTR FfiULT TREE SAFETY RUflLYSIS 
CUT SET • 1 D100 
CUT SET * ?. D202 D?02 
CUT SET • 3 D201 DC02 
CUT SET • 4 C2RE62-1 D702 
CUT SET • 5 C2RE62-2 D702 
CUT SET • G 0200 0702 
« • * * » END OF CRITICAL PATHS * * * * * 
I 
J^'fc^toK^^oMoWOfftc^oicmctcwciLiejfcy 
CRITICAL COflPS FOUND IN PATHS 











CUT SETS FOUND S( COHSO FOR LPTR FfiULT TREE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
n K f * * * * * * * * * * - * * * * **rJO«***!te********Jtotofc************ , .K** 
« i Dioa 
• Z D30! DP02 
• 3 B303 D702 
• 4 D203 D702 
• 5 1)202 D702 
• S D201 D7B2 
• 7 C2RE62-1 0732 
C2RE62-2 D702 
DZ8B D702 
***** END OF CRITICAL PATHS ***** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * i w c » ^ ^ 
CRITICAL COMPS FOUND IN PATHS 
C2RES2-1 C2RE62-2 D2BB 
I 
**KK**M.^tttrri&K^tt*:1c«v*i™!1t*imi*A*****jli**c4i***xee^***. +:k* -
MINIt-fiL CUT SETS FOUND BY C0HBO PCS LPT" F'- ' .T 
I * '* i .*. ' |ck*:M |t:K:M<>Mctekiri-< 
1 DI30 
2 Cl'i-CPSYS D?12 
3 C3LCR3YS P313 
4 CSSIDYPS D9I2 
3 C351BYPS D913 
6 DB12 D912 
7 D812 D9I3 
B D3L3 D912 
9 D313 D9I3 
IB C8S16BYP D9I2 
-33-
SKFETY PHALYSIS 
CUT SET * 
CUT SET * 
CUT SET » 
CUT SET • 
CUT SET • 
CUT SET • 
CUT SET • 
CUT SET • 
CUT SET » 
CUT SET • 
CUT SET • 11 C3S16BYP D913 
CUT SET • 12 D 3 H D3I2 
CUT SET • 13 D611 D913 
CUT SET • 14 C9LNI0NC CSLCRSYS 
CUT SET • lb C3LHI0NC C831BYPS 
CUT SET • lh CSLNIONC D812 
CUT SET • 17 C9LN10NC D313 
CUT SET • IB C9LHI0HC C0S16BYP 
CUT SET • 19 CSLNIONC D911 
CUT SET • 20 D91I C8LCRSYS 
Run 5 (Contd. 
CUT SET • zv 0911 C8S1HYFS CUT SET * IBS C3PE84- OB04 
CUT SET 4 22 P9J1 0812 CUT SET • iai C3PEB4-I 0803 
CUT SET • 23 0311 08-13 CUT SET « 182 0283 0912 
CUT SET « 24 1311 C8S16BYP CUT SET * 103 0203 0913 
CUT SET • 25 T911 D311 CUT SET • 184 0283 C9LN1QKC 
CLT SET t 26 i 10LNPPR CSLCRSYS CUT SET • 1B5 0283 0911 
CUT SET • 27 L13LNPPR CasiBYPS ~-T BET ifri H5G D~0!3 
CUT SET « 28 C13LNPPR 0312 CUT SET • 1B7 0283 • C1BLNPPR 
CUT SET « 29 CIBUNPPR D313 CUT SET • 1D8 02B3 0B06 
CUT SET • 33 C18LNPPR C3SJ68YP C'JT SET • 103 02B3 •C8S15BYP 
CUT SET • 31 CiaLMPPR 0811 CUT SET • lie 0283 0985 
CUT SET • 32 C8PERREC 0912 V T SET • in 0283 0834 CUT SET • 33 C8PERREC 0913 ' -'T SET • 112 0283 0803 * 
CUT SET • 34 C3PERREC C9LHIONC :-T SET • 113 0233 0882. 
CUT SET • 35 C3PERREC DJ1I .7 S=T * 114 rct!3 0808" 
CUT SET • 36 C3PERREC CIOLI'PPR , '7 EST « 115 0BQ1 
CUT SET • 37 C351PERR 0912 .. r ZFT v i:s ico2 0312 
CUT SET « 33 C8S1PERR D9I3 CUT SET • nr 02^' 0913 CUT SET < 33 C8S1PERR C9LN10NC CUT SET • 1LB 0282 C9LW0NC 
CUT SET * 48 C9S1PERR 0911 CUT SET • 119 0282 0311 
CUT SET • 41 C8S1PERR ClaLNPPR SUT-SET « 12S-
CUT SET • 42 D310 0312 CUT SET » 121 0282 C10LNPPR 
CUT SET • 43 oaie 0913 CUT SET • 122 0282 osas 
CUT SET « 44 Data C9LN1DNC CUT SET • 123 0282 C3S15BYP 
CUT SET * 45 03 la 0911 CUT SET • 124 0282 0385 
CUT SET * 4C DSia C1BLNPPR CUT SET • 125 0232 0334 
CUT SET * 4? D80S C8LCRSYS CUT SET • 126 0282 0883 
CUT SET • 48 0386 C8S1BYPS CUT SET • 127 0282 0082 
CUT SET « 49 DOGS 1.312 CUT SET » 128 02B2 usaa 
CUT SET < S3 0386 OB 13 •CUT SET • 129 0202 0831 
CUT SET i 51 0306 CBS16BYP CUT SET » 13a 0201 0912 
CUT SET • 52 0386 0811 CUT SET * 131 0201 0913' 
CUT SET 1 53 0806 C8PERREC CUT SET • 132 0201 C9LN10NC 
CUT SET 1 54 D306 CJS1PERR CUT SET • 133 .0281. 0311 
CUT SET < 55 0886 0B18 •euT-ss*-*- - * e s . 
CUT SET t 56 C8S15BYP C8LCRSYS CUT SET * 135 0281 C18LNPPR 
CUT SET « 57 CC315EYr C9S1BYPS CUT SET » 136 0201 0336 
CU'. SET * 58 CP515BYP 0612 CUT SET # 137 0281 C8S15BYP 
CUT SET « 5 q C?S15BYP BS13 CUT SET • 13B 0281 0335 
CUT SET « 50 CESI5SYF CBS16BTP CUT SET » 139 0231 0334 
CUT SET • 61 CBSI5BYP OBI] CUT SET » 140 023] 0883 
CUT SET « 62 CBS15BYP C8PERREC CUT SET » 141 0231 0882 
CUT SET • 63 CCS156YP CBB1PERR CUT SET • 142 02a i 0883 
CUT SET « 64 CBS15BYP 0818 CUT SET • 143 0281 oaat 
CUT SET * 65 uses C8LCRSYS CUT SET • 144 C2RE62-1 0912 
CUT SET i 66 DBT-5 C8S18YPJ CUT SET • 145 C2RF62-1 0313 
CUT SET * 67 DBdS 0812 CUT SET » 145 C2Rtd2-l C9LNI0NC 
CUT SET « 68 0B35 0813 CUT SET » 147 C2RES2-1 0911 
CUT SET • 69 OB05 C8SI6BYP •ajr-se-T « M O CJfiEgj i •ipsa 
CUT SET « 76 0B05 0811 • CUT SET • 149 C2R;S2-1 C18LNPPR 
CUT SET * 71 '1B85 C8PERREC CUT SET • 158 C2R£62-1 0886 
CUT SET • 72 .BBS C8S1PERR CUT SET • 151 C2RES2-1 C8S138YP 
CUT SET « 73 JBD5 08 IB CUT SET • 152 C2RE62-1 0883 
CJT SET • 74 0SB4 C8LCRSYS CUT SET • 153 C2FE62-1 0884 
CUT SET • 75 0834- - CBS1B.YPS CUT SET • 154 C2RE62-1 0883 
CUT SET • 76 0804 OB 12 CUT SET • 155 C2RE62-1 0882 
CUT SET • 77 0884 0BI3 CUT SET • 156 C2RE62-1 088£, 
CUT SET • 7B 1)884 C6S16BYP CUT SET • 157 C2RE62-1 0881 
CUT SET • 79 DBB4 OSU CUT SET • 158 C2RE62-2 0912 
CUT SET • ea 08B4 CBFERREC CUT SET • 15S C2RE62-2 0913 CUT SET • 81 08B4 C8S1PERR CUT SET • 163 C2RE62-2 C9LNI0NC 
CUT SET • 
CUT SET » 










CUT SET • 
CUT OCT » 
CUT SET • 
161 C2RE62-2 0911 
163 C2RE62-2 C18LNPPR 
CUT SET • 85 OB03 0B12 CUT SET • 164 C2RE62-2 0386 
CUT SET • 86 D8B3 0B13 CUT SET » 165 C2RE62-2 C8S13BYP 
CUT SET t 87 D8B3 CBS16BYP CUT SET • 166 C2RE62-2 0385 
CUT SET * 88 0803 IB! 1 CUT SET • 167 C2RE62-2 0504 
CUT SET « 89 DBB3 CBPERREC CUT SET • 163 C2RE62-2 0833 
CUT SET • 9D DEB3 CBS1PERR CUT SET • 169 C2RE62-2 0832 
CJT SET • 91 DB33 OB 18 CUT SET • 178 C2RE62r2. 083a 
CUT St" • 92 C3EES4-1 J>9]2 CUT SET • 171 C2RE62-2 089) 
CUT SET * 93 C3PEB4-1 0913 CUT SET • 172 &280 0912 
CUT SET • 94 C3PEE4-1 C9LNICNC CUT SET • 173 D200 -03.13 . . 
CUT SET • 95 CTFE34-1 0911 CUT SET • 174 0200 C9LNI0NC 
CUT 5ET * 96 C;Fr54-l C13LNPPR CUT SET • 17b 0200 0911 
CUT SET • 97 C3fi34-1 ocas •StrT SET 3'176 D S 9 8 — —«»93-
CUT SET • 98 C3REE4-1 CBS15B*P CUT SET * 177 0200 CIO'.NPPR 
CUT SET • 99 C31E64-I oses 
R u n 5 (Contd.) 
CUT SET • 176 D M B ' DED5 
CUT SET • 179 D200 CB51SBYP 
CUT SET * 180 D200 D605 .. 
CUT SET * 181 D200 T804 
CUT 5ET » 1B2 D200 D8B3 
CUT SET • 183 D200 DB02 
CUT SET • 184 D2B0 D8B8 
CUT SET • 185 D2BB IBBl 
***** END OF CRITICAL PBTHS ***** 
CRITICSL COrlPS FOUND IH PBTHS 
D9I2 D313 C3LCR3YS 
C3PERRSC C9SIP5RR DS1B 
D203 DZB2 D28I 
CB31BYP5 D812 f-313 
D835 C831SBYP D3S5 
C2SE52-] C2RE62-2 T>233 
CSS16BYP 3811 C9LNI0NC 
D3B4 22*3 DEB2 
5739 C1CLNPPR 





nlNItlfiL CUT SETS FOUND BY COflBO FOP 
CUT-SET- • 1—&9I-3-
CUT SET » 2 11913 
CUT SET • 3 C9LNIQNC. 
CUT SET » 4 D911 
CUT SET • S CIOLNPPR 
CUT SET * 6 D10B 
CUT SET • r D806 Da 13 
CUT SET » ' B DSSS C3516BYP 
CUT SET • 9 D806 Da 11 
CUT SET » IB D806 C83IBYPS 
CUT SET » 11 • D806 D814 
CUT SET » 12 0BB6 C8PERREC 
CUT SET « 13 DBB6 C8S1PERR 
CUT SET • 14 D30S D8IB 
CUT SET • 15 C8315BYP D913 
CUT SET • 16 CB3I5BYP C831GBYP 
CUT SET • 17 C8S15BVP D311 
CUT SET • 18 CBS15BYP C8SIBYPS 
CUT SET » 19 C8S15BYP D914 
CUT SET » 2B C8S15BYP C3P6RREC 
CUT SET » 21 CaSlSBYP C3S1PERR 
CUT SET • 22 CBSISBYP CSIB 
CUT SET • 23 DBB5 D813 
CUT SET • 24 D3Q5 CSS16BYP 
CUT SET • 25 D3B5 D 3 U 
CUT SET • 2o DBB5 C8SIBYPS 
CUT SET • 27 D8B5 D314 
CUT SET • 28 DBB5 CBPERREC 
CUT SET • 29 J883 C8S1PERR 
CUT SET • 38 DBBS D31B 
CUT SET • 31 08(34 D313 
CUT SET • 32 D8B4 C8SI6BYP 
CUT SET • 33 D3B4 DB11 
CUT SET » 34 DS04 C8S1BYPS 
CUT SET • 35 D304 D314 
CUT SET • 36 D304 CSPERREC 
CUT SET • 3? DB04 C8S1PERR 
CUT SET • 3B D8B4 Da IB 
CUT SET • 39 D8B3 0813 
CUT SET • 48 DaB3 CBS16BYP 
CUT SET • 41 D8B3 0811 
CUT SET • 42 DBB3 CBSIBYPS 
CUT SET » 43 D803 &314 
CUT SET • 44 D303 C3PERREC 
C U T S E T * 45 D383 CHSIPERR-
CUT SET * 48 DS03 D81B 
CUT BET • 47 C3REB4-! COBS 
CUT SET • 48 C3RE84-1 CBSISBYP 
CUT SET » 49 C3RE84-1 DSB5 
CUT SET t 58 C3PE84-1 D834 
CUT SET • 51 C3RE84-1 1)303 
SMT i tr « tn , n*i »i*t-
LPTR FJULT.TPEE SAFETY ONBLYSIS 
~"K;OMc*->-*'k-t M-i KMW4CK-K 
CUT SET • 53 D203 DSB6 
CUT SET • 54 C2B3 CBSISBYP 
CUT SET • 35 KM IBB3 
CUT SET • 58 D2B3 D8B4 
CUT SET • 57 D2B3 DSB3 
CUT SET « 5B D2D3 D8B2 
CUT SET • 59 P233 DBBB 
TUT SET • SB D2B3 D8B1 
CUT SET • B2 D2B2 DBB6 
CUT SET • S3 D202 C8SI5BW> 
CUT SET • 64 D202 D8B5 
CUT SET • 65 D2B2 D8B4 
C.T SET « 68 D2B2 D8B3 
CUT 5ET • 67 D2B2 D8B2 
CUT SET • EB D2B2 DBB3 
CUT SET • 69 D2B2 DBB1 
:UT SET • 71 D201 D8B6 
CUT SET » 72 D201 C8S15BYP 
CUT SET • 73 D2B1 DBB5 
CUT SET « 74 KB1 DBB4 
CUT SET • 75 D201 DBB3 
CUT SET • 76 D2S) D8B2 
CUT SET • 77 D2B1 D8BB 
CUT SET • 78 D201 D8B1 
CUT SET • SO C2PE62-1 Z1888 
CUT SET • 81 C2RE62-1 CBS15BYP 
CJT SET • C2 C2RJ62-1 D885 
CUT SET • B3 C2PE62-1 D8B4 
CUT SET • B4 C2RE62-I D8B3 
CUT SET • SS C2P562-I D8B2 
CUT SET • ES C2RE6Z-1 DBBB 
CUT 5ET • B? C2EE62-1 D8B1 
CU*-S6*J»- CO— -CE*E62-2~»78* 
CUT SET • •83 C2EE62-2 S8B6 
CUT SET » 90 C2PE62-2 CBSISBYP 
CUT SET • 91 U26E62-2 DB35 
TUT SET • ^3 C2P6S2-2 DB04 
CUT SET • 93 C2EE62-2 C8B3 
:UT SET • 54 C2RES2-2 D8D2 
Cl/T SET • 55 C2REE2-2 D88B 
CUT SET • 56 C2RE62-2 D8B1 
CUT SET » 98 t'200 DBB6 
CUT SET • 99 rceo CBS15BYP CUT SET • IBB D20B D8B5 
W SET • 1S1 D200 DBB4 
:JT SET • H'2 D20B D803 
CUT SIT • 103 MOB D8B2 CUT SET • 184 D20B teas 
-35-
D202 D2D1 C2RE52-I C22ES2-2 D;:O 
C9LNIDNC D3tl W8Z- C19L1PPR CSSS9YPS 
B50J D383 "aS? -„ B939 na-i; 
Dioa D3I4 C!3?S".5C C3PE3A-1 DM"! 
Run 6 (Contd.) 
7JT SET » J 0 5 D203 D8BI 
••••-IK* END CF CRITICAL PATHS * * * * * 
CRITICAL CC-PS FOUND IN PATHS 
C912 D9I3 D9I3 C8S15BYP D8L1 
CSSIPERR 8310 D J J S CSS:53VP DSC5 
Runs 15. 16 
I 
MINIMAL CUT SETS FOUNB BY COMBO FOR LPTR FAULT TREE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
*.* M » « « * * * » * * * l t » * * * * ^ » ^ « i » t * * * * * * * * * * i M t » * * * J M c M t * * * ^ ^ 
CUT SET • 1 D7B2 
CUT SET • 2 BIBB 
i END OF CRITICAL PATHS * * * * * 
1 
CRITICAL CGrPONENTS FOUND IN PATHS 
B 7 K DISS 
• 36-
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Run 2 (Contd.) 
H7IU n.n 0 .0 M70S 0 . 0 1.0 
M?n2 o.fl t . o H70«. 0 . 0 0 .0 
HNOO O.fl 0 .0 HS01 0 . 0 1.0 
H1001 n,o 1.0 H1003 0 . 0 n. o 
Hiooa G a (\ 0 .0 H100S u . u i . u 
H1006 (1.(1 0 .0 H100T o.e 1.0 
MSH8 n.o 1.0 H601 0 . 0 1.0 





H708 0 . 0 1.0 


















•(its e.e HS05 e.e 
H5D9 e.a 
" 5 ! B e.a 
-ee2 e.a 
>-tZ4 e.o 
f t : 6 B.B 




























I .B H6B5 
i.n KG07 
l . B H703 
1.0 H704 
e.e H801 



































'•M:K REOCHES 4.S MEGSI»TTS 
' SHTES 
K101 e.e e.e H203 e.e i.e 
F J O Z e.e i.e H20? e.e e.e 
H ; 0 3 e.e i.e HS06 e.e e.e H30I o.e 1.0 H302 e.e e.e >--03 O.D 1.0 H304 e.e o.e 
-;85 0.0 0.0 H30S o.a 1.0 
Hjer e.a e.e H30B e.e i.e 
H401 e.a e.e H402 e.e i.e H-03 a.e i.e H404 e.e e.e HJ05 e.s i.e H4BS e.e o.e Hior 0.0 l.B H40S e.e e.e 
"•501 e.B 1.0 NS02 e.e e.e h503 e.e i.e HSD4 a.e e.e H:OS e.a i.e H5BB e.e 0.0 
HSC9 e.a e.e HSB7 e.e i.e 
H5I0 e.e e.e H3II e.e i.e 
"£32 e.e i.e H603 e.e e.a 
K604 a.a i.e HS03 e.e e.e 
MC06 e.a i.e H6B7 e.e e.e 
:-roi a.e i.e H703 a.e B.B trcz e.e i.e H7B4 e.e B.e 
-SDO e.e e.e HSB1 a.e i.e HI GDI 0.0 i.e HIB03 e.e e.e H1C02 e.e e.e Hieas e.e l.B H1E06 e.e e.e Hiear e.e l.a FE68 e.a i.e H601 e.e i.e k7C5 e.e i.e H7B6 e.e t.e H707 e.e i.e Hree e.e i.e hiC04 e.B i.e 
EID 
Run 5 
FAST PCRIOD SCMrt LOUTOUEK 
met e.e e.e H203 
H202 e.e i.e H207 H203 e.e i.e H206 H3BI e.e e.B H302 H3D3 e.e e.e M304 USDS e.e i.e H30S h307 e.e i.e H308 H4B1 •.a i.e H402 
H4B3 ••• i.e H404 
H40S e.e i.e H406 H407 a.i i.a H408 HS01 a.e l.B H302 HS03 e.e i.e H3B4 H50S a.e t.B HSOB M50S e.e B.B H507 II5IB e.e e.e HSU Hf02 e.e l.B H603 H604 e.e i.e H6B3 
HEM e.e i.e H607 
H701 e.a e.e H7B3 
H702 e.e e.e H784 
KSOS e.e i.e HBBI H1001 a.e i.e H10B3 HICBZ e.e i.e HI 003 
tllOM e.e i.e H1BB7 
Hsee e.e l.B HEBI 
H703 e.e i.e H7B6 
H707 e.a i.a H70B 








































e.e i.e i.e 
a.e 
e.B 




e.e i.e i.e i.e 
.39-
Hun 6 
FAST PfcRIOD HIGH PCIUCR 
tores III"! 0.0 0.0 H203 B.8 1.8 
H-H2 0.0 i.e H307 e.a e.e 
n.:w 0.0 l.o H206 s.o e.e H30I 0.0 e.o H302 0.0 i.e H3P3 0.0 e.o H304 e.e i.e H5CJ5 o.e i.e H306 e.e e.e HAdr 8.B 1.0 H30B e.e o.e M-101 e.o i.e H402 e.e e.e IMW 0.0 1.0 H404 0.0 e.o M105 0.0 1.0 H406 e.e e.e H40? 0.0 i.e H4QB e.a e.e HOOl 0.0 i.e H502 0.3 B.B 
H503 e.o i.e H504 e.o e.o H505 0.0 i.a H506 e.s e.a H509 0.0 e.o Hsor 9.0 i.e 
HS10 e.o o.e H5I1 5.8 i.e H6U2 e.o 1.0 H603 o.a e.e H6B.1 e.o 1.0 H605 o.o e.o HK06 0.0 1.0 H607 0.0 e.o 
«roi 0.0 0,0 H703 0.0 i.e 
Hro2 0.0 0.0 H704 o.e i.e H300 0.0 0.0 H001 0.0 I.B 
HIOOl B.O 1.0 HI803 a.o e.a HI002 e.o e.o HI 005 B.8 i.e HID06 e.e 1.0 H1007 O.fl e.e H508 e.e 1.0 H60I e.o i.e H7D5 a.a i.e H706 e.e i.e H707 e.e i.a H788 e.e i.e HIOB4 e.e i.e END 
Run 15 
STARTUP SCCIMNT--SLOW SCRBflS AND FER10D FP.1LED--POUERWIU 
/ RATES 
NIDI e.e e.e H2B3 O.B l.B H202 e.e l.B H2er e..e e.a H2B5 e.e i.e H206 B.a a.e H30I e.e i.e H3B2 e.e a.e H3B3 B.B i.e H3B4 e:e e.e H305 e.e 1.0 H306 e.e e.e H3B7 e.e i.e H3BB e.s e.e H4BI e.e i.e H4D2 e.e e.e H4B3 e.e i.e H4B4 e.e e.e H405 e.e l.B H486 B.B e.B H4B? e.e l.B H4BB 0.8 a.a H50I e.e i.e H5B2 a.e e.e H5B3 e.e i.e H3B4 e.e e.e H505 e.e i.e HSBS e.e e.e H5B9 e.e e.e HSB7 e.B i.e HSIB e.B a.e HSU B.B i.e H6B2 e.e t.e H6B3 e.e e.B HE04 e.o i.e H6B5 B.B B.e H6B6 e.e i.e H6B7 e.e e.e H7BI e.e i.e H703 e.e e.B H"02 e.e i.e H7B4 e.e B.B HBOB e.e e.e HSBI e.e i.e Hioei e.e i.e H1BB3 e.e e.e HI002 e.e e.a HIBBS e.e i.e HI 00$ e.e i.a HI BB7 a.B e.e H5BB e.e i.e Hsei a.e i.e H705 e.e l.B H7B6 e.e i.e H7B7 e.e l.B H?ee e.e i.e HIBB4 e.e i.e W 
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Run 16 
srpRTUP flCCIDDIT--FAIL D 2 W SHU C3LNI0NC 
' PATES 
D23B a.a i.e C9UH10HC e.a 
H101 a.a B.B 11203 a.a 
!-C82 a.a a.a H23? e.e 
H^D1) e.a 1.0 H2BS e.a 
11391 a.a e.a H302 e.e 
HM1 a.a a.a H394 a.a 
H335 a.a a.a H3B6 e.a 
H33? e.o e.a H303 a.a 
H4BI a.a a.B H432 a.a 
H433 a.a l.B H4B4 a.e 
H435 0.8 i.a H4B6 a.a 
H4B? a.a 1.8 H4BB a.e 
HS3I a.e i.e H582 e.a 
H533 a.e l.a H5B4 e.e 
H535 a.a i.e H50S e.a 
H5B9 a.a a.a HSB? e.e 
H513 e.e e.e H3U e.a 
H6B2 a.a i.e H6B3 e.e 
H634 e.e 1.8 HSOS e.e 
HS06' a.a l.a H6B? e.a 
H?8I s.e e.e H?03 e.e 
HfB2 e.e i.e H7B4 a.a 
HBOB e.e e.a H8Bi e.e 
HI031 a.a i.e H18B3 e.a 
Hiaaj e.e e.e Hiaes e.a 
Hiaos e.e e.e Hiear e.e 
Hsaa B.B i.e Hsai e.e 
Hras e.e i.e Hres e.e 
H7BT e.e i.e H7B9 e.e 
H18B4 e.e i.e 
END 
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INPUT DECK REPRESENTING THE "AND" AND "OR" GATES 
FOUND IN THE FAULT TREE 
•TREBIL FBULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
LPTR FAULT TREE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
NUMBER OF GATES.tIG 233 
COMBO STARTING VALUE.MIN 1 
COMBO ENDING VALUE.MAX 2 
CUT SET - PATH SET SWITCH. IDEX1 B 
PRINT - PUNCH SUITCH.JDEX2 0 
MONTE CARLO STBRTER.MCS 0 
NO. OF RANDOM NUMBERS TO REJECT.NREJEC 0 
NO. OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS.NTF 0 
MIXING PARAMETER SUITCH. 1REN 0 
MONTE CARLO MIXING PARAMETER.TAA 
l * i k * * * * * # * * f : * * + * * * * * * * * i w n * * * * * * * # i ^ # * ^ 
*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
* * * * # * * * * * * * * + * * 1 o | o ( < * * * * * * * * * * * * * * i « 1 0 K * * * * * * ^ ^ 
LPTR FAULT TRCE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
NAME TYPE INPUTS 
TOP OR 2 1 G10I G182 DIBB 
Giei AND 3 B G105B GI0S8 G1B3 
GI82 AND 3 0 G104 G1B5C G1BSD 
GI03 OR 2 B G105C GI05D 
G!34 OR 2 0 G105B G105B 
G1B5A OR 1 G10EA r io io 
G105B OR 1 G10EB D101B 
G1B5C 01? 1 G1BGC U101C 
G105D UR 1 G1Q6D MOID 
G10611 OR 1 G1B7B D182B 
GK'bB OR 1 G1S7B P102B 
GidbC OR i Gia?c M02C 
G106P OR i GiarD D1B2D 
GlOr,-' AND 2 0 G1BSA GI89B 
G107B AND 2 0 G1B8B G103B 
Giorc AND 2 a GIOBC G1B9C 
G107D AND 2 B GI0B9 GI89D 
G108B OR 1 1 G2G0B D103A 
G1QSB OR 1 1 G280B D1B3B 
GI80C OR 1 1 G2BBC. DIB3C 
GiesD OR 1 1 G2B8D D103D 
G109A OR 1 1 G70BA H101 
G10JB OR 1 1 G7B0B H1B1 
G109C OR 1 1 G?OOC H1B1 
G109D OR 1 1 G7BBD H101 
G208A OR 1 1 G2B1 D28B 
G280B OR 1 1 G2Q1 D280 
G20OC OR 1 1 G2B1 D2D3 
G2B8D OR 1 1 G2B1 D280 
G2B1 OR 1 2 G2B3 C2PE62- C2RE62-2 
G203 OR 2 1 G294 G20S D2BI 
G204 AND 2 S G2BE G2I2 
G2G5 AND 2 B G2B6 G210 
G206 OR 1 1 G287 D202 
G28? AND 2 0 G28B G209 
G20B OR 1 1 G3B0 D293 
G209 OR 1 1 G2IS .H202 
G2IB AMD 1 1 G2U H2B3 
G2I1 OR 8 2 D204 C2S2-I 
G2I2 OR I 1 G2I3 H285 
G213 AND | 1 G214 H206 G2I4 OP B 2 C2PCLF C2RE75-I 
G2I5 AND 1 1 G21S H28? 
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G2I6 OK 1 1 GIOOB C2RE83-1 
G3QB FIND 2 0 G30I G3ir 
G38I OR 1 1 G382 0300 
G382 AND 2 B G303 G3I4 
G303 OR 1 1 G304 D3B1 
G384 AND 2 « G3B5 G311 
G385 OR 1 1 G3B6 D3B2 
G306 AND 2 0 S3B7 G3SB 
G38r OR 1 ) G4BB D3B3 
G3B8 OR 1 1 63W H3B7 
G309 AND 1 I G310 H308 
G?]0 OR i i G M D C3PE81-2 
G311 OP 1 1 G3I2 H305 
G312 AND I 1 G313 H306 
G3I3 OP 1 1 G90S C3PE82-2 
G314 OR 1 1 G315 H303 
G315 ONff 1 i G3I6 H304 
G3I6 OR 1 1 G806 C3PE83-1 
G3ir OR 1 1 G31S H301 
G3ie BUD 1 1 G319 H302 
G3I9 OR 1 1 GC11 C3RE84-I 
GOOD AND 2 0 G401 G41? 
G401 OR 1 1 G402 1400 
G402 PND 2 B G403 G414 
G483 OR 1 1 G4B4 D4Q1 
G484 AND 2 S G405 G4II 
G405 OR 1 1 G486 D402 
G406 AND 2 0 G40? G408 
G40? OR 1 1 G5O0 D403 
rios OR 1 1 G409 H407 
G4B9 flND 1 ! G410 H408 
G410 OR B Z C4TR0BLC C4PEIB-2 
G4I1 OR 1 1 G4I2 H405 
G412 AND I 1 G4I3 N-IOG 
G413 OR 8 2 C4TR0BLI 1 C4PEI9-2 
G4I4 OR 1 1 G415 H403 
G415 AND 1 1 G416 . H4IM 
G416 OR B 3 C4EXSCRM C4C0IL32 
G417 OR I 1 G4I8 H401 
G4I8 AND 1 1 G419 H402 
G419 OR 1 1 G1IOB C4REBB-2 
G5BB AND 2 8 GSB1 GS18 
Gsei OR 1 1 G5B2 D50B 
GSB2 AND 2 B G583 GS1S 
GS03 OR 1 1 G5Q4 I'501 
G504 AND 2 B G505 G512 
G505 OR 2 1 G506 G508 
G506 AND 1 1 G50r H50r 
G58? OR 1 1 G600 DS03 
G58B AND I 1 G509 H5BB 
G589 AND 2 0 G51B G5I1 
G5IB OR 0 3 H589 H51B 
G511 OR B 2 DS84 C5PB7 
Oil?. OR 1 1 G513 H505 
G513 AW ! 1 G5I4 H506 
G514 OR B 4 C5RDT CSSU2-1 
G515 OR 1 1 GSIG HSB3 
G516 AND 1 1 G517 H504 
G5I7 OR B 2 CSTROBLA C5REI6-J 
G518 OR 1 1 GSI9 H501 
G519 AND 1 I GS2B NSB2 
G520 OR B 2 CSTROBLB C5RE17-2 
G600 AND Z B G60I GSIB 
G601 OR 1 1 G602 D60I 
GG02 AND 2 B G6B3 6oQ7 
G603 OR 1 1 GGB4 D602 
G6B4 AND 1 1 G6B5 H681 
G685 OR 1 1 G6B6 HE02 
G6B? OR 1 1 G60S H6B4 
G6DS AND B 2 C6SCRMPB H603 
- 4 3 -
flrip 1 1 G6CI9 H " r i 5 
OP 0 5 C S l E l f M S C lMVULZ C 6 R B 2 - 1 
OR 1 1 0 6 1 1 H t ' " t 
n t iD 1 1 G S l i »• f i r 
OF 0 3 CGPLLDS C f - t M L C O C S P E G O - l 
n p I 2 G - o i n C I H Q I L f i t r o i n 
OR 1 2 G . - 0 I P r.rtroiLEt l O ' l B 
OP 1 2 G 7 0 I C C 7 ! t O I L C D - 0 | r 
OR 1 2 G 7 0 I P l / t K O I L D M O I D 
OR 3 0 G 7 0 2 A G 7 0 3 A G 7 0 4 S 
OR 3 0 G 7 0 2 B G7D3B G 7 0 J B 
OP 3 0 G702C G703C G704C 
OF 3 0 G 7 0 2 & G703D G70-1D 
Ql l t i i 2 G r o w H 7 0 1 H 7 0 2 
OtlP 1 2 G 7 0 5 B M 7 0 1 H 7 0 2 
BNP 1 2 G7CI5C H 7 0 1 H 7 0 2 
n n [ i I 2 G 7 0 5 P H 7 0 I H 7 0 2 
A M P 1 2 6 M 6 S H 7 0 2 H 7 0 3 
M I D 1 2 G 7 0 6 B H 7 0 2 H 7 0 3 
P.ND 1 2 G706C H 7 0 2 H 7 0 3 
M I D l 2 G r r j e n H 7 0 2 H 7 0 3 
AND 1 2 G 7 0 7 B H 7 0 3 H 7 0 J 
flllD i 2 G ? 0 7 B H 7 0 3 H 7 0 4 
AND 1 2 G707C H 7 0 3 H 7 0 4 
M I D 1 2 G 7 0 7 D H 7 0 3 H70«t 
OR 1 2 D70S C7IIM1PA D 7 0 2 
OP 1 2 G7>18 r 7 t H ' T 3 D 7 0 2 
OP 1 2 G708 C / l t i U f C P 7 0 2 
OP 1 2 G 7 0 8 c r u i i P D D 7 0 2 
OR 1 2 G 7 0 9 C7MAIIPA D7IJ2 
OP 1 2 G.-09 r n v i ' i p o P 7 0 2 
OP I 2 G 7 0 9 I : 7 I I M I I P C [>702 
OP 1 2 G 7 0 9 C 7 l t A t F D 0 7 0 2 
OP 1 2 GV10 C7IIAMPB D 7 0 2 
OP 1 2 G 7 I 0 C7tt f lMPB D 7 0 2 
OR I Z G 7 I 0 C 7 ( i f t r i p c D 7 0 2 
OR 1 2 G 7 I 0 C7IISI1PD I>702 
U N D 3 1 6 7 1 1 C 7 1 5 G 7 1 9 H 7 0 3 
A N D J 0 G 7 I 1 G71S G 7 1 ? G80B 
HMD 1 3 G 8 0 0 HTOS H 7 0 7 H 7 0 8 
OR 1 2 G 7 I 2 r c c i - D 7 0 4 
OR 1 1 G 7 1 3 P 7 0 3 
OR 1 1 G r i d T'706 
OR B 2 C 7 I 0 N C H P D 7 0 7 
OR 1 2 Q 7 1 6 P 7 0 9 D 7 1 0 
OR 1 1 G 7 1 7 P 7 I 1 
OP 1 1 G 7 I B D 7 1 2 
OP 0 2 C710NCHB D 7 1 3 
OR 1 2 0 7 2 8 D 7 I S 0 7 1 6 
OR 1 1 0 7 2 1 D 7 I ? 
OR 1 1 G722 D71B 
OR 0 2 C7I0MCHC D 7 1 9 
OR I 2 G 3 0 1 PGOO DSB1 
OR 1 1 GC02 P 8 0 2 
OR 1 1 G S 0 3 D 8 0 3 
OR 1 1 G 8 0 4 t>804 
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